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Since neither the law in general nor post-classical Roman and later Medieval
law in particular are within my areas of specialization, my comments do not
address directly the more technical aspects of Prof. Hohmann’s manuscript.
But Prof. Hohmann’s essay offers more than just technical considerations of
legal presumptions. He offers to a reader like me an opportunity to think about
and comment on historiographical method in the study of rhetoric and
argumentation. I will focus my response on method, using it as a gateway to
some very general considerations of Prof. Hohmann’s conclusions about the
development of presumptions in legal argumentation from antiquity to the
Middle Ages.
In the opening line of Professor Hohmann’s first analytical section he writes,
"Even before the term ‘praesumptio’ was used to denote the concept, the
Roman jurist Scaevola introduced a presumption into legal controversies." The
move that Prof. Hohmann makes here is particularly attractive to someone
who, like me, believes that cultural activities do not need to be named and
codified in order for individuals to participate in them consciously and
successfully. Of course this belief is not without opposition. At present a
fashionable historiographical method in the study of rhetoric, for example,
holds that prior to the coining of the term "rhetoric" and the development of a
systematic and philosophical vocabulary for oratorical practice, along with
codifications of this practice, cultures could not participate in this activity with
full consciousness and sophistication. This way of thinking about history seems
to follow in the tradition of early German philology, a tradition to which the
famous Bruno Snell belongs. Snell argued that prior to the coining of the term
"self" individuals were not conscious of one; thus, they lacked consciousness
of agency. This view leads to the popular and readily drawn conclusion that
Homeric people, for example, were mere vehicles for the will of the gods. This
view also leads to conclusions that notions of probability were absent in such
cultures. In a world where divine will shapes all action and where individuals
have no access to this will, the argument goes, individuals are unable to say
what is likely to happen. As one scholar has recently noted, if at any point Zeus’
wrath could prevent the sun from coming up, no notion of the sun’s likelihood to
rise can enter fully into the consciousness of individuals.
Such critiques of the development of consciousness, either in general or in
particular relation to rhetorical practices, set up hierarchies of cultures. Such
hierarchies presuppose cultural development from the primitive to the
sophisticated, from the naïve and accidental to the informed and purposive. Of
course the latter points of each are the privileged points, the celebrated teloi.
Such critiques not only seem to proceed with the arrogance of the superiority
of the achievements of rationality (rationality here being very narrowly defined),
they seem to fly in the face of the evidence evidence that is of course largely
overlooked because of the constraints of this ideological framework. Please
indulge me a bit longer to present two pieces of evidence on this theme before
making the connection to Prof. Hohmann’s essay.
First, when Odysseus in the Odyssey sees his handmaidens flirting with the
suitors his first response, fuelled by his anger, is to come out of hiding and kill
each one. He checks his anger though and opts to wait for a better plan and a
more opportune time, reminding himself that when in the cave of the Cyclops (a
situation far more grave than his current one), checking his anger, thinking of a
better plan, and waiting for a more appropriate time allowed him to escape
successfully and achieve revenge. That Odysseus is thinking probabilistically
seems evident. He thinks that since waiting worked in the case of the Cyclops,
it is likely to work in his current situation.
Second, when in the heat of battle at the end of the Odyssey, Odysseus
realizes that his enemies gained access to what he thought was a locked
armory, he accuses (to himself) the handmaidens for what he thinks is an act of
treason. Of course we know this in not the case, and Telemachus does
confess to his carelessness in leaving the door open, but this outcome is not
the interesting point here (though it holds interest for other reasons such as
possibly being the first admission of guilt in the western literary tradition).
Rather, the interesting point is Odysseus’ presumption of the guilt of the
handmaidens: a presumption we can guess is based on his having witnessed
their lack of loyalty the night before.
Both of these examples seem to reveal that probabilities and presumptions
are not beyond the intellectual range of Odysseus despite his having no
knowledge of the formal terms "probability" and "presumption" nor the theories
that would eventually be formalized for them.
Now returning to Prof. Hohmann’s essay we can see the significance of the
way he frames his project by saying that even before the term "praesumptio"
was used to denote the concept, a Roman jurist introduced presumption into
legal controversies. Not only does Prof. Hohmann seem to reject privileging the
formal appearance of "praesumptio" as the proper place to begin his study of
presumptions in legal argument, he goes on to write that the early use of
presumption in legal argument already shows the subtle interplay of empirical
and normative considerations that characterizes the treatment of presumptions
in the Roman law of the Corpus Iuris as a whole. The phrase of particular
interest to me that Prof. Hohmann uses here is "subtle interplay." Prof.
Hohmann seems to affirm that in the absence of the word "praesumptio" and
the later formal treatment of it in Roman law, it not only played a role in legal
controversies but it was capable of showing subtlety, which seems to be a
mark of sophistication.
From the start of his analysis then, Prof. Hohmann seems to qualify carefully his
project so as to avoid the pitfalls of the fashionable historiographical method I
addressed earlier. This seems to me to be a particularly important move for
Prof. Hohmann to make because his project is to trace the development of
legal presumptions from antiquity to the middle ages. Any such project risks
the teleological thinking characteristic of those employing that fashionable
historiographical method. But Prof. Hohmann seems to resist treating
development as achievement on several occasions, not just the opening line to
which I have already referred. At one point when he addresses the report of the
jurist Ulpian that it was preferable that the crime of a guilty man should go
unpunished rather than that an innocent man be condemned, my mind
immediately went to earlier signs of such privileging of normative rather than
empirical presumption like perhaps in Antiphon’s Murder of Herodes. Lucky
for me, Prof. Hohmann reduced some of my work in looking for such a
reference with a footnote to Antiphon’s work at 91 in Murder of Herodes where
the defendant urges the jury to give him the benefit of the doubt with the words,
"If then you must make any mistake, it would be less of an outrage to acquit me
undeservedly than to condemn me without just cause; for the former is only a
mistake, while the latter is also an eternal disgrace." Prof. Hohmann writes,
"Such passages show that the idea of presumption on innocence is not a
creation of the Common Law."
Another relevant point at which Prof. Hohmann seems to resist the critique of
development as achievement comes in his discussion of the contrast between
the ancient rhetor and the medieval jurist. Prof. Hohmann writes that in the
classical tradition of rhetoric it was the common sense (doxa) of the community
which undergirded the artistic arguments of the rhetor. But, he writes, in the
more technically complex and increasingly professionalized legal system, the
lawyer’s argumentative art focuses on the law as the primary foundation of
forensic arguments. With this contrast defined, Prof. Hohmann cautions us not
to overstate it: "On the one hand the juristic sources themselves are to a
considerable extent a codification of common sense; on the other Pilius’
treatment of these arguments shows very clearly, the authorities cited do not
completely determine either the advocate’s argument or the judges decision.
And what links the ancient rhetor and the medieval jurist is the search, among
premises endorsed as persuasion or even recognized as binding by the
audience for arguments which can support both sides in a controversial case."
Such a caution seems to work against interpretations of development as
achievement and instead invites an interpretation of development as difference
(though not to the exclusion of some key similarities).
Still again, Prof. Hohmann seems to resist treating development as
achievement by disabusing us of the idea that Richard Gaskins’ discussion of
the rhetorical uses of burden of proof is a uniquely contemporary discussion.
Prof. Hohmann’s project shows us that such rhetorical argumentative
procedures can already be found in ancient law. And again, he disabuses us of
the idea that Richard Whately should be attributed as the author of the legal
conception of presumption. Rather we can see now a much earlier
appearance of this conception in Pilius’ Libellus Disputatorius. Moreover,
Prof. Hohmann makes a powerful case for regarding this earlier treatment as
better than the latter ones, once again undermining any notions of development
as achievement.
I would like to emphasize, in conclusion, that my enthusiasm for Prof.
Hohmann’s project arises primarily from my respect for his historiographical
method. I look forward to learning more about the technical analysis which
forms the heart of this project, and the issues surrounding this analysis which
will enable a critique of it, since I presume such insight will allow my
enthusiasm for his project to grow.
 
